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Abstract
The reserve banks’ check collection service was designed in 1913 to serve as “glue,” attaching
the new central bank to the commercial and financial markets through member banks.
Successful creation and operation of the Federal Reserve System was thought to be more likely
if the reserve banks could do more for member banks than lend occasionally and administer the
reserve requirement tax.  Initial drafts of the Federal Reserve Act would have allowed member
banks to use required reserve deposits only for making interbank transfers.  But correspondent
banking relationships already provided interbank payment service, as well as check collection
and other services, while offering a modest interest rate on interbank deposits.  Nationwide
check collection service was added to the bill in the latter days of the legislative process to
show potential member banks that deposits maintained at the new regional reserve banks could
play an integral part in the banking business.1
Is it an anachronism that the twelve Federal reserve banks compete with
commercial firms in producing and distributing payment services to depository
institutions?  Will their continued presence in the market become less useful?  Such
questions are beginning to have more than quaint historical interest.  The future value of
the priced-service operations of reserve banks is being viewed with increasing skepticism
in some quarters, and not without reason.
Since the Monetary Control Act of 1980 required that reserve banks charge prices
that recover full cost, their market share in check collection has declined, securities
safekeeping services have been discontinued, and new commercial competitors have
emerged in both the check collection and automated clearinghouse markets.  The prospect
of unfettered nationwide branch banking after December 1997 suggests further erosion of
reserve banks’ market share, as former collection items stay within the operating centers
and accounting systems of newly created nationwide branch banking organizations.
Growing reliance on electronic technology in the payment system may compound
these institutional forces.  Reserve banks serve depository institutions, but if
nondepository institutions become operators of electronic payment networks, reserve
banks would be relegated to providing net settlement service, at most.  Moreover, reserve
banks are not the same as ordinary commercial suppliers, despite their need to recover
full cost plus an allowance for profit.  The Board of Governors must approve all major
additions to, or changes in, the reserve banks’ service lines, including those that take
advantage of new electronic payment technologies.  Board approval is based on public
interest considerations as well as commercial standards.  These may have different
implications for electronic payments today than for paper payments in years past.
Without adapting to modern payment methods, however, reserve banks could become
mere museums of outmoded technology, delivering currency and check collection
services to the last users of paper payment products.
The original public purpose of reserve bank operations is not widely appreciated.
Much has changed, of course, since Woodrow Wilson signed the Federal Reserve Act in2
December 1913.  Institutional arrangements, financial technology, and the Act itself have
evolved into new forms that might make the founders’ intentions irrelevant in the
contemporary environment.  Reviewing those intentions, however, can be useful in
thinking about the reserve banks’ future role in providing payment services, for it entails
understanding a world where no such involvement existed.  At the very least, the exercise
provides a useful historical perspective on the situation today.
This paper explores why the founders of the Federal Reserve System thought it
was important for the reserve banks to provide check collection services.  Certainly, the
intentions of its founders have been examined in great detail ever since the beginning of
the System, not least by those claiming to have founded it.  This well-plowed field,
however, does not extend into payment service operations.  Instead, the central topic has
been elasticity and control of the supply of money and credit.  Contending founders have
left scant explanation of why twelve reserve banks received a franchise to produce and
distribute check clearing, collection, and settlement services.  Even as late in the
legislative process as October 1913, at a prestigious professional meeting to investigate
the proposed Federal Reserve Act, the discussant dealing with the clearing and collection
provisions of the House bill felt obliged to begin by saying that
[t]he proposed plan to reform the American banking system presents a number of
interesting and difficult problems.  Few of these deserve more serious and
thoughtful consideration, and none appear [sic] to have received in public
discussions of the pending bill less attention than those involving the domestic-
exchange and clearing-house functions of the federal reserve banks. (Talbert
[1913-14], p. 192)
A quest for the founders’ intentions has at least two branches.  One is
organizational.  It concerns why the Federal Reserve System has twelve autonomous
regional Banks, each with its own balance sheet, rather than (as was the case with other
central banks in 1913) a single federal balance sheet operated upon by employees located
in regional branch offices.  This organizational matter was a fundamental issue in the
national debate prior to passage the Act.  It was argued that centralization would
economize on base money, but that regional control would ensure the application of3
informed local knowledge in local credit judgments.
1  Ultimately, however, this was a
highly charged political matter reverberating with concerns about central authority versus
local control and about public interest versus market outcomes that are not directly
relevant here.
The second branch of the quest is functional, about why the reserve banks were
given a check collection function in addition to the receiving, paying, lending, and open
market functions of a bank.  There is no necessary relationship between the collection and
bankers’ bank functions.
2  Early plans for a central banking-type institution did not
include the collection business in their design.  Some explicitly provided for central bank
membership in local clearing houses, to avail the new banking institution of the services
other banks received in making and receiving payments.  Moreover, provision for the
reserve banks’ collection function seems to have been a late addition to the Federal
Reserve Act.  Why should this be?  And what perspective does the answer provide in
pondering the future of reserve bank payment services?
The remainder of this paper is in four parts.  The first looks at the dominant
strands of monetary reform proposals before the Act was drafted—essentially, before the
national election of November 1912 brought Woodrow Wilson to the White House and
Democratic Party control to the Congress.  The question here concerns how widespread
the conceptual case was for having a central banking institution enter the collection
business.  The second section looks at who some of the principal founders were.
Identifying these founders is easier than understanding their intentions, for, as already
noted, most of them were silent about the collection function.  The third section analyzes
clearing and collection provisions in successive versions of the Federal Reserve Act as it
made its way through Congress in 1913.  This section’s purpose is to establish when, and
to suggest why, the check collection provisions became part of the Act.  The fourth part
                                                
1  Carter Glass was an ardent supporter of decentralized control; Paul Warburg emphasized local knowledge
of local borrowers.
2  For example, contrast the role of the Federal Reserve in the payments system with that of the Bank of
Canada or the Bank of England, whose payment system operations are limited almost entirely to interbank
settlement.  These matters were not likely to have escaped the notice of the founders, who had only recently4
brings together these apparent lessons of the past concerning why the reserve banks might
have been given their initial payment services franchise, before the paper concludes with
some thoughts about the relevance of the story to current issues.
To anticipate the findings of this paper, the reserve banks’ check collection
service was created to serve as “glue,” attaching the new central bank to the commercial
and financial markets through member banks.  Successful creation and operation of the
Federal Reserve System would be promoted if the reserve banks could do more for
member banks than lend occasionally and administer the reserve requirement tax.  Initial
drafts of the legislation limited the reserve banks to making transfers of funds between
member banks’ reserve accounts—interbank payments.  But correspondent banking
relationships already provided interbank payment service, as well as check collection and
other services, while offering a modest interest rate on interbank deposits.  Nationwide
check collection service was added to the bill in the latter days of the legislative process
to show potential member banks that deposits maintained at the new regional reserve
banks could play an integral part in the banking business, replacing correspondent bank
services.
I.  CLEARING AND SETTLEMENT IN THE BANKING REFORM MOVEMENT
The Federal Reserve Act evolved from banking reform movements that had been alive in
the United States almost from the moment the National Banking Act was adopted during
the Civil War.
3  The early and continued impetus for reform was the inelastic supply of
money—i.e., of specie, greenbacks, subsidiary coin, national bank notes, and bank
deposits.  The incentives for banks to issue national bank notes produced a secular
decline in the proportion of eligible Treasury debt not already posted as note collateral
(Champ, Wallace, and Weber [1994], pp. 350-52).  Deposit money was limited by the
                                                                                                                                                
received the published research reports of the National Monetary Commission, including studies of the
monetary and credit systems of a number of foreign countries.
3  West provides a valuable condensed chronological account of the reform movement.  He begins with
Treasury Secretary Richardson’s 1873 proposal (renewing similar Treasury proposals a decade earlier) to
eliminate interest payments on demand deposits.  See West (1977), pp. 36-88.5
available stock of base money reserves, which excluded national bank notes.  Interest
paid on interbank deposits was thought to ensure that banks would hold no more vault
coin than necessary to maintain customer satisfaction; any excess “reserves” would be
held as interest-bearing deposits in the notorious pyramid of interbank deposits whose
apex was invested in call loans that financed trading positions in the New York securities
markets.  Any outward shift in demand for specie money, whether seasonal, cyclical, or
secular, required a contraction of bank deposits until the specie flow mechanism induced
a specie inflow.
The Baltimore Plan, presented at the American Bankers’ Association convention
after the Panic of 1893, the Indianapolis Monetary Commission Plan, adopted after the
Panic of 1897, and the Fowler Bill that emerged from the House Committee on Banking
and Currency after the Panic of 1907, all had in common the provision of an asset-based
currency, one whose supply was designed to vary with the demand for bank credit, rather
than being limited by the stock of Treasury debt.  In the Fowler proposal, this simply
involved “a replacement of national bank notes with notes backed by bank assets, and a
guarantee fund established by the banks” (West [1977], p.46).
None of these reform plans dealt directly with deposit money, or with the clearing
and collection of checks.  Asset-based currency, however, raised questions about what
kind of organization might be allowed to create and redeem currency, and at what
discount rate.  Clearing houses already offered examples that oriented the reform
movement “naturally” toward an expanded clearing house arrangement to ensure
elasticity.  Members of a clearing house maintained deposits of specie coin and currency.
In addition to settling by offset, clearing house deposits avoided the repeated, costly
transportation of coin and currency between two banks’ offices to settle their bilateral
position.  The level of an individual bank’s clearing house deposit would vary over time,
reflecting the sequence of its multilateral net credit and net debit positions at successive
settlements.  Organizing a regional or national clearing house had appeal as a means of
economizing on the aggregate amount of specie tied up in the banking system,
unavailable for circulation.  The assumption was that the more extensive the membership6
of a clearing house, the narrower would be the range within which a bank’s net debit and
credit positions would be expected to vary over time.
At a more fundamental level,  the clearing house example was instructive as a
potential means of providing elasticity.  Clearing houses issued interbank currency in the
form of clearing house certificates to signify members’ deposits of cash reserves.  Also,
they sometimes created additional certificates by lending to members, at least when
banking panics made this expedient.  One view of the reform needed in the United States
was the organization of more extensive clearing houses.  These could be linked to ensure
the routine creation of base money through loans to member banks and open-market
purchases of securities, as well as economy in the use of reserves.
It’s not surprising that the next phase of reform proposals developed out of the
clearing house concept.  A central bank could institutionalize and regularize creation and
destruction of money, providing elasticity in the clearing house model.  None of the
plans, however, provided explicitly for performance of any clearing or collection
function.  In fact, what was being proposed seems to have amounted to a bankers’ bank,
whose deposit and note liabilities would be a new vehicle for bilateral settlement of
interbank debts arising out of any and all interbank transactions.  Transferring ownership
of deposits in a new institution might replace transfers of clearing house certificates, of
deposits in a common correspondent bank by check or draft, and of shipments of specie
coin and currency.
These implications for bilateral interbank settlements were clearly recognized.  In
1908, Paul Warburg proposed creation of the United Reserve Bank, with branches
throughout the nation.  Banks using its services would maintain balances at this
nationwide correspondent bank.  The United Reserve Bank would have the right to
transfer sums of  money from the account of one bank to that of another upon request.
Banks’ transactions with the United Reserve Bank, however, would be settled through
normal banking channels, as members of local clearing houses (Warburg (1930), vol. I,
pp. 49-55).7
A particularly lucid account of the settlement function came from Harvard
Professor Oliver M. W. Sprague in 1910.  He noted the
… advantages gained if [a] central bank establishes a system for handling the
domestic exchanges between all the places in which it has branches, by means of
which all payments between banks can be met by transfers on its books.  The
Reichsbank has perfected a system of this sort which has proved of great
advantage, making it possible to make payments throughout the country speedily
and at a minimum of expense. …
… The present situation regarding the domestic exchanges [in the United States]
is far from satisfactory either to the business community or to the banks.
Collections and payments are subject to delay and involve heavy expense,
burdensome to most banks tho to some extent shifted upon their customers.
Practically the entire expense of the domestic exchanges could be saved.  The
actual cost to [a] central bank would be far less than that inevitable under the
present system, or lack of system … . (Sprague [1911], pp. 160; 162)
These benefits were becoming widely noted, with publication of National Monetary
Commission studies that included Cannon’s Clearing Houses, and investigations of the
banking and payment systems of at least a dozen foreign countries, including studies of
the roles of central banks in payment clearing and settlement (Cannon [1910]; National
Monetary Commission [1910], various volumes).
The “system, or lack of system” to which Sprague referred was the check
collection process of the day.  Checks deposited in banks that were drawn on other local
banks would be presented through the local clearing house, if one existed, either directly
by a member bank or through a correspondent that was a member. Clearing house items
allowed multilateral net settlement among members.  Checks drawn on distant banks
could be sent to a common correspondent, or to one that shared a local clearing house
with the payor bank, either directly or through yet another correspondent, or could be sent
by mail or other delivery service for direct presentment to the payor bank or its
correspondent.  Again, settlement might be through a correspondent balance, with final
settlement always possible by shipping specie withdrawn from a correspondent or
clearing house.
If the aggregate of payment flows between two regions netted to zero, local
markets for distant “exchange” might redistribute ownership of distant correspondent8
balances among local banks without needing to ship specie.  When the aggregate did not
net to zero, the price of “exchange,” the local premium charged for the purchase of distant
balances, might rise high enough to induce shipment of specie to achieve final settlement.
The cost of exchange was used as a rationale for check collection fees charged by paying
banks for items presented to them directly, ostensibly as reimbursement for making final
settlement to the distant payee bank in funds drawn on a distant correspondent.
Much of the structure of obtaining and pricing domestic exchange would be
eliminated if all banks were to become members of, or have access to, a common clearing
house, and if that common institution absorbed transportation charges for delivery of the
residual coins or notes used for final settlement.
4  The “burdensome” aspect cited by
Sprague was not so much the domestic shipment of specie balances between regions,
much of which may have reflected changing seasonal needs for hand-to-hand currency.
The true cost came from extra bookkeeping and transportation of checks routed through
strings of correspondents, and resource allocation distortions that fees and float
introduced to markets when compared with a payment system served by a nationwide
clearing house.
A variety of proposals for improving the check collection system had appeared
during the decades leading up to the Federal Reserve Act.  Recommendations from the
National Monetary Commission clearly recognized the possibilities noted by Professor
Sprague, and were incorporated in the Republican bill introduced in 1912 by the
chairman of the commission, Senator Nelson Aldrich.  It proposed a National Reserve
Association, whose 15 branches would have the duty “upon request, to transfer any part
of the deposit balance of any bank having an account with it to the credit of any other
bank having an account with the National Reserve Association … by mail, telegraph, or
otherwise, at rates to be fixed at the time by the manager of the branch at which the
transaction originates” (Warburg [1930] p. 296).   While the national association could
require local associations to act as clearing houses, “[i]t should be noted that none of the
                                                
4  Both the Aldrich Bill and The Federal Reserve Act (after amendment in October 1918) stipulated that the
central institution would absorb the costs of shipping notes.  See Warburg (1930), pp. 350-351.9
commission’s recommendations for payment system reform required par clearing, nor did
they authorize the main NRA branches to engage in clearing operations, leaving clearing
to the local associations instead.  So the commission’s recommendations could hardly be
said to add up to a national clearing system” (Duprey and Nelson [1986], p. 24).
When the Republican bill died in the Democratic Congress, Paul Warburg
circulated a memorandum in January 1913 that contained a new plan involving four
regional banks (consistent with the Democratic platform’s opposition to a central
reserve), including “a system of free transfers of balances from one [of the four] to the
other … to be worked out regulating exchanges between cities.” (Warburg [1930], p. 90)
An important point to keep in mind about clearing and collections in the banking
reform movement is that, although some persons pointed to an inefficiency, the system
then in place worked.  Clearing, collection, and settlement of payments was not a major
concern of the movement.
5  Centralization, concentration, or mobilization of the specie
reserves of the banking system, and elasticity in the supply of money were the consuming
functional objectives.  Reducing the burden of interbank transfers of funds outside of
clearing houses—domestic exchange—was simply a potential byproduct of reform.
II. WHO WERE THE FOUNDERS?
Federal Reserve System founders came in many varieties.  Indeed, so many writers made
proposals to reform the U.S. banking system before 1913 that there is no easy way to
specify which complaints and cures ultimately led to creation of the Federal Reserve, or
even to determine when the process of creation began.  William Jennings Bryan is a good
example of this fuzziness.  The Federal Reserve hardly represented his triumph over the
Cross of Gold, but silverites’ concerns about powerful interests in control of money and
credit resonated through the Pujo Subcommittee Hearings in 1912 and 1913, and may
have echoed in the legislation.  Even as Wilson’s Secretary of State, Bryan is
                                                
5 For example, “[A] peripheral concern [after the Panic of 1907] was the private banking sector’s failure to
develop an efficient national clearing mechanism for intercommunity checks” (Nelson and Duprey [1986],
p.23).10
acknowledged to have played a crucial role in designing certain parts of the legislation
(Willis [1923], pp. 247-57).
Founders also came after 1913, in the form of implementers like Treasury
Secretary McAdoo, the galvanizing presence on the Reserve Bank Organizing Committee
that determined the number and coverage of reserve banks and supervised their
organization.  Also, members of the original Federal Reserve Board were especially
important for the collections business.  The reserve banks encountered serious difficulties
in implementing this part of the new legislation.  As a result, the Board had to wrestle
with some fundamental competitive and legal issues that soon went to the Supreme Court
as part of a long-simmering controversy over par collection.
The present focus, however, is on those who came between the writers and the
implementers.  These were people involved in the legislative process that began with
Senator Aldrich’s introduction of the Republican bill in January 1912, an effort doomed
by the 1912 electoral triumph of the Democrats.  From this starting point, the process
continued for almost two years, ending with passage of the Act on December 23, 1913.
6
Drafts of legislation had circulated before 1912, but we are interested primarily in those
who translated concepts into legislation through negotiation and compromise.  Which of
these people determined the Act’s design has been a subject of controversy for three-
quarters of a century, because the major participants published conflicting accounts of the
process.  Even a cursory review of the sequence of these accounts suggests that potential
founders were not bashful about identifying themselves and their contributions, but that
few of them claimed any responsibility for, or even awareness of, the payment services
franchise in the Act.
The Federal Reserve Act is sometimes referred to as the Owen/Glass Bill.  Robert
Owen was Chairman of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency in 1913.  He
yielded “… to the suggestion that [he] should write a short sketch of [the Act’s] origins
and principles, as a personal reminiscence” in 1918.  His account traced the major
                                                
6  The full story of the Act is an oft-told tale, nowhere better than in A Christmas Present for the President
(Dunne [1984]).11
features of the Act to positions he had taken in national monetary reform debates, starting
with the 1896 Democratic Party Convention.  Nowhere in this short book does he
mention the clearing and collection functions of the reserve banks (Owen [1919]).
Carter Glass was Chairman of the House Committee on Banking and Currency in
1913 and sponsor of the legislation that emerged from the House of Representatives.  In
1926, Charles Seymour, history professor and later president of Yale, published The
Intimate Papers of Colonel House.  House, a self-confessed confidant and advisor of
Woodrow Wilson, was considered by Seymour to be the “guardian angel” who, more
than anyone else, was responsible for the Act.
7  Glass was offended, “because the rank
and vocation of [Seymour] are calculated to get for this utterly unfounded claim a
measurable credence among those unacquainted with the facts.”  He determined to
publish “the real truth of the matter…to…overtake and destroy the fiction which has been
launched by Professor Seymour in the guise of history.”  Glass’ 1927 account suggests
that he, with some guidance from President Wilson “… under whose direction the Federal
Reserve Act became law,” maneuvered his draft legislation through the House of
Representatives and into law, beating off efforts to achieve a different design by Senator
Owen, Secretary McAdoo, and Samuel Untermyer (who conducted the Pujo
Subcommittee’s Money Trust Hearings). The account deals with the Act’s clearing and
collection provisions, beginning at his initial conference with the newly elected Woodrow
Wilson, when Glass proposed, as an optional item, providing for par collection of
interbank payments (Glass [1927]).
Untermyer then disputed Glass’ story, immediately and with equal passion.
Among other things, he claimed that Glass “by indirection and implication undertakes to
filch from Senator Owen and others and to take unto himself credit for accomplishments
to which he is not entitled and which history will not accord him,” but with no mention of
clearing and collection (Untermyer [1927], p. 2).
                                                
7  “The Colonel was the unseen guardian angel of the bill, constantly assisting the Secretary of the Treasury
and the Chairmen of the Senate and House Committees in their active and successful labor of translating it
into law” (Seymour [1925] vol. 1, p. 160).12
Paul Warburg weighed in next, with his monumental book, The Federal Reserve
System, begun in 1927 because Glass’ account “impelled [Warburg] to lay down in black
and white [his] recollections of certain events in the history of banking reform” (Warburg
[1930], p. vii).  Warburg had been an early, persistent, and consistent advocate of a
central bank for the United States, modeled on European examples.  He was among the
select group at Jekyll Island that formulated the Aldrich Bill, and a respected expert on
banking matters.
In addition to these principal actors in the legislative process, staff members
claimed to have played a significant role.  H. Parker Willis was the “Committee expert”
hired by Carter Glass to assist in producing the House bill.  Not surprisingly, his story of
the legislative process, published in 1923 in his massive tome, The Federal Reserve
System, was essentially the same as that later told by Glass, though without the evident
passion.  J. Lawrence Laughlin, whom “[s]ome friends …urged…to set down [his]
personal experiences connected mainly with the events before the actual passage of the
Federal Reserve Act,” replied ten years later (Laughlin [1933]).  He and Willis had
worked together at the National Citizens’ League for the Promotion of a Sound Banking
System.  Laughlin had been Chairman of the organization’s Executive Committee in
1910-13, and earlier had been Willis’ professor at the University of Chicago.  Laughlin is
at pains to show that, although they did not acknowledge it, both Glass and Willis were
intellectually indebted to Laughlin’s own early draft of reform legislation, “Plan D,”
submitted to them privily and at their behest in early December 1912.
This list undoubtedly could be extended further, to other underappreciated
founders of the System who depend, to varying degrees, on self-promotion for their
proofs.  By 1931, when he published his memoirs, William McAdoo wrote that “[t]here
must be at least a dozen” people who “claim the credit for having originated the Federal
Reserve Act” (McAdoo [1931]).  The important point, however, concerns the subjects
covered in these recollections, not the overabundance of claims to founder status.  Much
of the controversy among the founders has been blamed on the secrecy with which Glass
and Willis operated, and their apparent inability to share credit for ideas  (West [1977],
pp. 113-35).  In the case of clearings and collections, however, none of the other founders13
disputed the limited remarks of Glass and Willis, except for a two-sentence stipulation of
“a system of clearings for all checks of member banks throughout the nation” in
Laughlin’s “Plan D.”  Even after the Act had become law and the reserve banks’
collection problems landed in the Supreme Court, none of the other founders had
anything to say about why the reserve banks were designed to provide check collection
service.  The fact that the rationales of Glass and Willis for the reserve banks’ payment
business franchise excited no response from the other founders suggests that it is
reasonable to accept their versions of how this aspect of the Act evolved.
III. EVOLUTION OF THE ACT IN 1913
Willis’ book (1923) provided appendices containing complete texts of the initial bill
created by Senator Owen and the competing initial drafts of Chairman Glass’ bill, as well
as successive versions of the Federal Reserve Act as it emerged from the House, the
Senate, and as signed by Woodrow Wilson.  These drafts, and the commentary from
various founders, provide evidence about reasons for the reserve banks’ payment services
franchise. Tables 1 and 2 of the present paper contain a chronological digest of the
clearing and collection provisions of six versions of the legislation, starting with the
doomed Aldrich bill and ending with the Act as passed in 1913.  Differences from one of
these drafts to the next, charting the development of the Act, are discussed in what
follows.
The Democrats’ 1912 party platform opposed the Aldrich Bill.  According to
Warburg,
The Democratic platform, as printed, … contained the provision: “The
Democratic party is opposed to the Aldrich Plan or a central bank.”  At the time, it
was widely stated that the plank, as adopted by the Democratic Convention, read
“the Aldrich Plan for a central bank,” and that, when the document was printed,
either by inadvertence or by a Machiavellian trick, it was made to read “the
Aldrich Plan or a central bank.”  Whatever the truth may be, the Chairman of the
House Committee of Banking and Currency, Mr. Glass, who, later on, was
charged with the formulation of a new plan, adopted the second version as binding
upon himself. (Warburg [1930], p. 79)14
The party platform was not explicit, however, about any features to be desired in reform
legislation.
Democrats had reason to avoid referring to the product of their legislation as a
central bank, but they also had reason to soft-pedal clearing house terminology in the
legislation.  The Pujo Subcommittee of the House Banking and Currency Committee
conducted its Money Trust Hearings in 1912 and early 1913, and published its
recommendations at the end of February 1913.  Relations between that subcommittee and
the one chaired by Carter Glass are said to have been strained.  Arsene Pujo, Chairman of
both the House Committee and Money Trust Subcommittee, had staked out an
investigation of anticompetitive banking practices as the most promising endeavor for the
period leading up to national elections.  Carter Glass, next ranking member of the full
Committee, accepted the less promising task of chairing a subcommittee to draft reform
legislation.  The 1912 three-party national election, however, allowed the Democrats to
capture both houses of Congress as well as the White House.  Legislation became a
strong possibility, overshadowing the Money Trust.  Samuel Untermyer, Counsel to the
Pujo Subcommittee, tried to have the new Congress undo the division of labor between
the two subcommittees, so that the Money Trust subcommittee would shape central
banking legislation.  Carter Glass, having become Chairman of the full Committee upon
Arsene Pujo’s retirement, objected and prevailed, and the Money Trust investigation
ended quickly.
8  Its own legislative recommendations were restricted to a number of
proposed amendments, mostly to the National Bank Act, and mostly dealing with national
banks and clearing houses.
The Pujo Hearings’ sensational emphasis on the role of clearing houses in anti-
competitive banking behavior might not have been supportive of the reforms envisioned
by someone like Carter Glass.  His initial conception was of reserve banks with a banker-
controlled national coordinating board.  This might have placated banking interests, but
                                                
8  The Pujo investigation ended after the Subcommittee was unsuccessful in getting the lame duck president,
Taft, to instruct the Comptroller of the Currency to collect, from large national banks, loan and investment
data that would allow overlapping interests from the financial sector to be traced into the commercial and
industrial sectors.  Ironically, the Subcommittee made its final, unsuccessful request for data on December15
not those worried about a “Money Trust.”  In a decision that may be related, Glass,
having tested on Wilson the option of providing par collection of interbank payments,
made this a feature of all but one of the subsequent drafts of the Act in the House.  Thus,
even if reserve banks were banker-controlled, the law would not allow the incidence of
exchange charges to rest visibly on customers.
The Aldrich, Glass, and Owen Proposals
The first draft attributed to Chairman Glass was completed in February 1913, near the end
of the Pujo Hearings that had resumed in December 1912, and after Committee Hearings
in the House and consultation with President Wilson.  The proposed clearing and
collection provisions differed from those of the earlier Aldrich Bill in three ways.  First,
reflecting Warburg’s for/or matter, the Aldrich Bill had envisioned a National Reserve
Association with a single national balance sheet, operating through regional branches.
This early Glass bill, on the other hand, called for at least 15 autonomous regional banks,
joined together through a national board of oversight—Woodrow Wilson’s suggested
government "capstone,” which would regulate interregional interbank funds transfers.
9
Second, whereas Aldrich proposed a credit transfer system, Glass specified debit
transfers.  The National Reserve Association of the Aldrich Bill was intended to transfer
balances from the account of one bank to that of another, at the request “by mail,
telegraph, or otherwise” of the paying bank.  Glass reversed the process, directing a
Reserve Bank to respond to a request (the deposit of a check or draft) by a receiving bank
for a credit to its account.  It was then up to the Reserve Bank accepting the deposit to
arrange, directly or indirectly, for authorization to debit the account of the paying bank,
by presenting the item for its scrutiny.  This early preference for debit transfers helped
encumber the American payment system with what became one of its more vexing
institutional problem:  Transferring debits means that the payor has little, if any, incentive
to improve the speed of the collection process, and the payee has little leverage to do so.
                                                                                                                                                
26, 1912, the same day Carter Glass and Parker Willis traveled to Princeton for their first consultation with
Woodrow Wilson about prospective banking reform legislation.16
Third, while the National Reserve Association was to have had unspecified
blanket regulatory authority over the credit transfer process, the Glass draft was more
specific.  Debit transfers were to be made “at par and without charge for exchange,” and
the Federal Reserve Board was to set “regulations governing the transfer of funds at par
among Federal Reserve Banks.”
In the Senate, the original Owen Bill of May 1913 was more like the earlier
Aldrich bill than the Glass bill.  It authorized credit transfers, with no mention of par
payments.  Perhaps recognizing the issue of exchange charges raised in the Pujo
Hearings, however, to which Glass’ response was par collection, Owen would have given
the Board explicit authority to fix reserve bank charges for transfers, as well as general
authority to regulate transfers between  reserve banks.
A curious feature of this early Owen draft is that, unlike the Aldrich bill, it would
have created eight independent regional reserve banks, but with no provision for settling
gross or net transfers between reserve banks.  The Board was only to “provide regulations
and to establish charges for the transfer of deposits from accounts kept with one reserve
bank to accounts kept with another.”  Owen’s bill seemed designed merely to use
government price setting to override the commercial interbank exchange markets.
10
Of course, interregional transfers were easy under the Aldrich Bill because of the
National Reserve Association’s single nationwide balance sheet.  Like shipments of
specie, but far cheaper in operation, “shipments” of ownership of account balances on the
books of the association would have accomplished nationwide settlement.  Glass’ early
draft could not adopt Aldrich’s centralized account holding because of the Party platform.
Without a common central bank or clearing house, 15 Reserve Banks settling with each
of 14 other Reserve Banks would have entailed 105 bilateral net settlement positions,
                                                                                                                                                
9  Livingston (1986), pp. 190-91 says that, after 1909, “proposals for a central bank, whatever their source,
nearly always used the concept of regional reserve centers.”  This seems valid in characterizing the regional
emphasis in location and organization, but not in the crucial sense of autonomous regional balance sheets.
10  This conception persisted even after the Act was passed and the Reserve Banks began operation.  In May
1915, the “Governors” of the twelve Banks recommended that the charge for interdistrict mail transfers of
funds be fixed at each of the Banks based on cost, but, mimicking pre-1913 exchange markets, that the
charge “not exceed the cost of shipping currency to the nearest subtreasury city”  (Willis [1923], p. 788).17
probably requiring that many specie shipments or purchases of exchange to settle each
period’s interregional interbank transfers.  Apparently in recognition of this complexity,
Glass proposed that the Board have discretion to act as a clearing house for the Reserve
Banks.  This would at least limit to 14 the maximum number of specie shipments or other
transactions needed to complete a net settlement—a distinct cost saving, even if not quite
as simple as the Aldrich proposal.
11
Taken together, these three early legislative proposals promised more timely, less
costly interbank adjustments of balances.  Transfers of Reserve Bank account balances
between banks would replace purchases of exchange and shipments of specie in
achieving final settlement of interbank payments.  Whether at par or not, interbank
payments would be expected to be completed faster and more cheaply because settlement
could be on the books of a nationwide set of institutions that did not necessarily have to
ship specie to reflect regional imbalances in payments.
Each of the three early bills provided for nothing more than interbank transfers,
except for the hint of one additional feature in a single sentence of Glass’ proposal.  This
would have allowed the Federal Reserve Board to require a Reserve Bank “to exercise the
functions of a clearing house for its shareholding banks.”  Accepting Cannon’s then-
recent definition of a clearing house as “a device to simplify and facilitate the daily
exchanges of items and settlements of balances among the banks …, ” a Reserve Bank
could have provided a settlement service without resort to this clearing house provision
(Cannon [1910], p.1).  The Glass bill already contained authority for the Reserve Banks
to accept checks and drafts drawn by any bank with an account at any Reserve Bank on
any bank in the district that had an account with the Reserve Bank.
If the Board had directed a Reserve Bank to act as a clearing house for member
banks in its district (not for all its depositors), convincing those members to use the
clearing house might not have been so easy.  Somehow, the Reserve Banks would have
needed to “facilitate the daily exchange of items.”  In a city, this typically would involve
                                                
11  The System Gold Settlement was the eventual solution, allowing settlement by transferring ownership of
gold that was stored immobile in a warehouse.18
at least providing a meeting place and clerks to calculate net debits and credits of banks
attending meetings of the clearing house.
12  In an era of fledgling telephone, rail, and
truck networks, a lot more would have been required to induce members across a whole
district to transport items to a central clearing house instead of shipping them directly to
the paying bank or to a correspondent bank.
The House, Senate, and Reconciliation Bills
Glass introduced his bill into the House in late June.  The clearing and collection
provisions of this version were somewhat different from those of the February version
(and even from those of the early June print for the House Banking and Currency
Committee).  The minimum number of reserve banks was reduced to 12 (the words
“reserve bank” no longer were capitalized), and the Board would be allowed to designate
one as the inter-reserve bank clearing house, rather than doing the job itself.
13  More
significant, however, were two other changes.
The first of these eliminated nonmember banks as potential customers for the
interbank funds transfer service of the reserve banks.  The February version authorized
accepting deposits from any bank or trust company, but the late-June version restricted
depositors to member banks.  The second major change (see table 1) was the addition of a
more explicit legal basis for operating a check collection business:
It shall be the duty of every Federal reserve bank to receive on deposit at par and
without charge for exchange or collection checks and drafts drawn upon any of its
depositors or by any of its depositors upon any other depositor and checks and
drafts drawn by any depositor in any other Federal reserve bank upon funds to the
credit of said depositor in said reserve bank last mentioned.
                                                
12  Before technological change made this method obsolete, the Cleveland Federal Reserve Bank’s main
office provided the Cleveland Clearing House with: a meeting room with a table and chair for each local
bank, bins in which packages of items might be placed, and a clerk with forms and a 10-key calculator for
figuring net positions and testing their consistency with settlement.
13  Chicago and Richmond were considered (Warburg [1930], pp. 163-64).19
The addition of the six italicized words (emphasis added) meant that each reserve bank
now would accept from its members any check drawn by any account holder at a member
bank, on that account, rather than accepting only interbank checks.
 14
Opening up each reserve bank to a much broader set of checks meant that it would
have to collect a potentially large volume of items.  This would involve presenting items
to member banks directly or through their correspondents and local clearing houses in the
district.  Each reserve bank now would be an intradistrict clearing house in both meanings
of the words: settlement, and simplifying and facilitating the daily exchange of items.
Authorization to operate an intradistrict check collection business thus was added to the
business of making interbank transfers nationwide at par—without exchange charges and
(in a new provision, added to accompany authorization to enter the check collection
business) without collection charges.
The bill that emerged from the House in September had clearing and collection
provisions identical to those in the bill that Glass had introduced in June.  By December,
however, the Senate bill added one last new feature.  This clearly enabled the reserve
banks to operate a nationwide check collection business, not just 12 independent
intradistrict collection businesses.  A reserve bank now would be allowed to accept
members’ deposits of checks drawn on any other member in its own district, as well as on
any member in another district.  In addition to the nationwide system for making
interbank transfers that had been envisioned by the earliest founders, the Act now
authorized the reserve banks to operate a nationwide check collection system, in
competition with local clearing houses, correspondent bank services, and direct
presentments.
15
                                                
14  This study deals with the development of Section 17 of the Federal Reserve Act.  Section 13 also relates
to acceptable deposits.  Spahr suggests that difficulties in reconciling the two sections confused the Board,
adding a layer of difficulty to their decisions about what to do with the underutilized collections franchise
when it was newly introduced.  See Spahr (1926), p. 164.
15  Other differences in the clearing and collection provisions of the various drafts were of minor
importance  The Senate removed the phrase “at par,” but the final version of the Act retained it.  Both the
Senate’s and the final version altered the prescribed method of interdistrict transfers of exchange.  The
House version had required an in-district member bank to draw funds from an out-of-district bank by having
the distant bank send a check or draft drawn on its reserve bank.  The Senate modified the procedure so that
any member bank or customer of a member bank (such as a respondent bank or corporate cash manager)20
IV. WHY?
The final clearing and collection provisions of the Federal Reserve Act contained
two distinct authorizations for the reserve banks, one for nationwide interbank transfers
of member bank balances on deposit with a reserve bank, and the other for operating a
nationwide check collection business.  The question is what the founders intended to
accomplish with these two authorizations.
First and foremost, they wished to take advantage of a new federal institution that
could reduce the cost of exchange almost to zero both within a district and, if properly
designed, between districts.  Any of the three initial legislative drafts was capable of
accomplishing this, simply as a byproduct of the larger intention of creating a federal
institution that could manufacture and distribute base money through visible
administrative decision, not the Invisible Hand.
The new vehicle for eliminating exchange charges was intended to achieve
efficiencies from what today would be called network externalities in both demand and
production.  Carter Glass alluded to economies of this sort, as well as to the correction of
anticompetitive pricing practices, when he urged the House to support the reconciliation
bill on December 23, 1913.  The bill would, he said, “put an end to the flagrant abuse
involved in excessive charges … for collections and exchange.”  Although some had tried
to remove the par collection provision, “those of us in the House who sought to tear down
these tollgates upon the highways of commerce prevailed.”  Nor was this merely a reform
of abuse.  “It will eliminate wastefulness incident to many independent collection
organizations by substituting one compact collection system.  It will abolish … exchange
charges altogether and appreciably reduce charges against collections” (Glass [1927], pp.
326-27).
Second, the franchise for reserve banks to operate a check collection service did
not appear in the Federal Reserve legislation until the latter months of 1913.  Only
halfway through the year did the House bill acquire explicit provisions for a reserve bank
                                                                                                                                                
could draw a check on its out-of-district account, deposit the check in its own local account, and have the
check remitted to the other district reserve bank for collection.21
to accept anything other than interbank checks.  Only in the last week of the legislative
process did the Senate version of the bill provide the basis for nationwide check
collection service.
Increasing efficiency was not the reason for adding this franchise to operate “one
compact collection system.”  The apparent waste involved in circuitous routing of checks
through the correspondent collection system was long recognized and should have been
eliminated when exchange charges disappeared.  Free—or much cheaper—exchange
should have provided the basis for something much closer to par collection of checks.
The rationale for check collection fees had been that a paying bank absorbed the
exchange charges involved in making funds available in the locale of the receiving bank.
If the reserve banks were going to supply exchange without charge,
 competition among
banks supplying checking accounts would eliminate the check collection fees that
reflected those charges.
The basic reason for the collection franchise was some combination of waning
faith in the power of market competition and waning faith in passage of the Act.
Bankers’ reactions to the developing legislation in 1913 must have raised doubts about
both competition and legislative success.  Many bankers resolutely opposed the Act,
which would oblige national banks to become members of the new system, to subscribe
to its stock, and to maintain reserves in the form of deposits at reserve banks.  These cash
reserves would be over and above both coin and currency held for operating purposes
and, after a transition period, over and above any balances maintained in other banks.
Requirement levels seemed likely to be comparable to those of the Comptroller, then in
force for national banks.  Sagacious bankers, of course, would be expected to consider the
prospective advantages and disadvantages of membership in the new institution, as
compared to those of avoiding membership.
Even without the check collection feature, membership would have permitted
banks to credit their depositing customers at par—without any exchange charge—and to
sell exchange at par, should anyone want to buy exchange instead of simply sending a
check that would be collected at par.  Disadvantages were several.  Reserve banks would22
not pay interest on deposits, whereas correspondent banks typically did pay interest on
interbank balances.  A reserve bank would not be a full-service bankers’ bank, so
balances would have to be maintained at correspondents over and above required
reserves.  A bank’s customers would still be depositing some items drawn on nonmember
banks that charged collection fees.  Thousands of small banks across the nation were said
to book significant portions of their revenue in the form of exchange charges and
collection fees.  As long as membership in the new institution and par collection were not
universal, a bank that reduced its income from charges and fees might not experience a
comparable reduction in expenses from charges and fees.
Universal membership seemed less and less likely as the legislative process
continued.  Reserve bank services that originally were designed for all banks became
restricted exclusively to member banks, and only national banks might be compelled to
become members.  The proposal for compulsory membership of national banks met an
outcry of opposition.  There was always the possibility that banks would give up national
charters in  favor of state charters, so as to avoid compulsory membership.  These
possibilities were recognized, as illustrated in this defensive diatribe of Senator Owen in
response to an unidentified questioner in October 1913:
A Voice: Why should the national banks be compelled to go into the organization?
Mr. Owen: They are not compelled to come into the organization.  They can go
out of it if they don’t like it. … When the government of the United States
establishes this new system, which has been found necessary to prevent panics,
and gives the national banks as well as the state banks and trust companies the
advantage of cooperation, under government safeguard, if a national bank happens
to be unwilling to conform to the reasonable and just requirements demanded by
the national welfare and the bank’s own best interest, it would be a vital error on
the part of the government to permit this whole system to be destroyed, by leaving
it optional whether a bank avails itself of it or not.  If the indifference of a bank,
its lack of understanding, its apathy, its neglect or its ignorance of the law and its
advantages is to be controlling, the system would not be established with any
certainty.  Men would stand off and say, “Let others join this; I will see how it
works before I go into it.”  The consequence would be that the possible
advantages of this system would not be realized.  It is a righteous and just thing
that when the government has worked out carefully the details of this plan, and
after long study is well assured of its advantages, having put the microscope upon
the bill with extreme care to see that it is just and sound in every particular—it is23
righteous and just, I say, to make the plan compulsory.  Obviously the system
itself cannot be permitted to fall by leaving it merely optional.  It ought to be
made a success.  It deserves to be made a success.  The national interest requires
and therefore justifies it. (Owen [1913-14], pp. 9-11)
Check collection service was added to the bill’s original exchange provisions to
make membership in the Federal Reserve System, par remittance, and the potential
elimination of exchange charges more palatable to banks and more probable to legislative
leaders.  In midyear, the House version had added intradistrict check collection service,
with provision for distant paying banks to use checks drawn on their reserve accounts to
remit the proceeds of their customers’ checks sent directly to them.  Then, at year’s end,
the Senate added nationwide check collection service.
Parker Willis had not mentioned these considerations in drafting the commentary
of the House Banking and Currency Committee on the proposed Federal Reserve Act
when it was submitted to the House in June, before nationwide check collection was
added to the Act.  He said only that
[t]he object of these [clearing and collection] provisions is twofold:
1.   To establish par transfers of funds among the banks in each Federal
reserve district.
2.   To establish par transfers of funds between Federal reserve districts
(Willis [1923], p. 334).
Nothing is new here, for these two objects clearly were intended by the earlier Aldrich,
Owen, and Glass bills.  Willis’ comments on the same matter a decade later, however, are
more pertinent:
[T]he reason for calling for par collection and for requiring each reserve bank to
act as a clearing house for its members, was found in the fact that only in this way
did it seem likely that the federal reserve system would ever attain its full stature
or would succeed in getting a regular flow of business to and from its member
banks. (Willis [1923], p. 1053)
[T]he reason for the existence of the federal reserve clearing system was far
deeper and more important than any consideration of exchange charges.  Par
clearance was necessary in order to direct the stream of checks and drafts to the
reserve banks and thus to keep the reserve balances there constantly living and
changing, thus preventing them from becoming mere dead sums of cash held
simply because required by law. (Willis [1923], p. 1062)24
This matter of living versus dead cash balances was not unique to Willis.  For example, in
responding to questions from Laughlin on plans for the Aldrich Bill two years earlier,
James W. Forgan, president of Chicago’s First National Bank spoke to the question
“whether banks through the country should keep their active accounts with the branch of
the [proposed] National Reserve Association in their district or keep them with their legal
reserve agents [correspondent national banks] located in the same city, having their
balances with the National Reserve Association more or less idle” (Laughlin [1933],
p. 28).  Walter Spahr came at the same point from the other side in 1926.  The Act
contained transitional provisions permitting member banks to hold part of their required
reserves as correspondent balances with national banks.  He argued that ending this
permission would increase the demand for the reserve banks’ collection service by raising
the relative cost of a correspondent relationship (Spahr [1926], pp. 195, 197).  The
perspective is the same as that of Forgan and Willis.  The viability of the reserve banks
depended on their taking clearing and collection business away from the correspondent
banks.
To summarize, the intention of the founders in specifying reserve banks’ activities
in the payment system largely were developed within the single year of active legislative
drafting that preceded passage of the Act.  Until late in June 1913, before Carter Glass
introduced his bill into the House of Representatives, the clearing and collection
provisions of the Owen and Glass bills were much the same as those of the Aldrich Bill a
year and a half earlier.  All versions would have institutionalized the market for exchange
by allowing nationwide interbank transfers of funds on the books of the new institution.
Addition of intradistrict check collection provisions in late June and of
interdistrict check collection in December were the real innovations, for they moved
beyond the widely recognized settlement efficiencies of a bankers’ bank.  As long as
membership in the new System was more or less voluntary, check collection business25
might be used to attract members and ensure the viability of both the legislation and the
System.
16
V.  LESSONS FOR TODAY
The founders added the check collection franchise to the Act to ensure success in
weaving reserve banks’ operations into the fabric of everyday financial market activity.
They sought success in order to achieve the lofty objectives of reform: “ … to furnish an
elastic currency, to afford means of rediscounting commercial paper, to establish a more
effective supervision of banking in the United States, and for other purposes.”  Of course,
the reserve banks did not have authority to do whatever they wished in seeking the
success of their nationwide check collection system.  A series of court cases set limits on
some of the reserve banks’ methods of inducing nonmembers either to become members
or, at least, to refrain from imposing exchange and collection charges.
17  The point
remains, however, that the basic reason for including check collection in reserve banks’
franchise was to anchor the existence of the reserve banks with a significant operating
role in the financial system.
The founders’ practical insight is clear.  The central bank needed institutional glue
to become attached to the commercial and financial system.  This was to be provided by
taking over a significant share of the market for interbank and check collection services,
previously provided by the correspondent banking system.  To this they added other
correspondent services over the years.  The reserve banks’ provision of financial services
was not intended to secure public benefit directly by correcting market failures or
externalities, but rather to avoid irrelevance.  The public benefit provided by the reserve
banks’ check collection and other services was to be the institutional anchor they could
provide for the monetary policy and lender-of-last-resort functions of the central bank.
                                                
16 Duprey and Nelson ([1986], p. 26) have argued that the intention of the clearing and collection features
of the Federal Reserve Act was to “make the personal check a more advanced, convenient, and acceptable
means of payment for intercommunity transactions,” and only incidentally to ensure passage of the
legislation and the viability of reserve banks.   Analysis of the evolution of the Act over the course of 1913
suggests the opposite: Legislative success and institutional survival were the primary motivation, with
promotion of the use of personal checks as a byproduct.
17  A detailed review of the series of relevant court cases is given in Spahr (1926), pp. 232-290.26
Nationwide par collection of checks drawn on member banks did not prove to be a
sufficient inducement to membership in the initial experience of the Federal Reserve
Board.
18  Additional legislation in 1916 authorized the reserve banks to collect from
nonmember banks, and, in 1917, to collect for nonmember banks that remitted at par and
maintained clearing balances with the reserve banks.  Moreover,
[i]n addition to the attempts already made by the Federal Reserve Board to enlarge
the scope of the clearing and collection system, the Board consciously and
persistently made arrangements and innovations that were designed to make the
system more advantageous and attractive to the non member banks … [including]
… the elimination of service charges and the absorption of other costs by the
Federal reserve banks. (Spahr [1926], pp. 200-201)
In the long run, these measures never guaranteed robust membership in the
Federal Reserve System, although nonpar banking finally disappeared.  Eventually, in
1980, the Monetary Control Act extended reserve requirements to all depository financial
institutions and ensured their access to reserve bank services.  The reserve tax no longer
acts as a disincentive to membership, but neither does exclusive access to “free” services
act as an incentive.  Since 1980, further reductions in the stated level of reserve
requirements and repeated banking inventions for avoiding such requirements have
elevated the role of services in determining the volume of deposits banks hold at the
reserve banks, through operational needs for clearing balances.  At the same time, the
Monetary Control Act now requires the reserve banks to price services to recoup full cost
plus an allowance for the profits a competitor would have to earn to survive.  The demand
for clearing balances rests squarely on the reserve banks’ ability to be successful in
providing services.
Concerns about central bank irrelevance have begun to emerge again, reflecting
three somewhat different forces.  As noted, demand for central bank deposits has been
withering, as technology and legislation whittle down the coverage and tax rate of reserve
requirements (Stevens [1993]).  The imminent arrival of full-scale interstate branch
banking is capable of melting some of the glue that now attaches the Federal Reserve
                                                
18  The Board’s Annual Report during this period summarizes its experience.  Details are in Warburg
(1930), Willis (1923), and Spahr (1926).27
System to the financial system.  Nationwide banks will be in a better position to offer
competing nationwide correspondent bank and check collection services; nationwide
banking consolidation will make “on-us” items out of former interbank payments.
Looking further into the future, the spread of electronic banking and of nonbank
participation in the operation of new payment networks raise questions about the viability
of a central bank organized on pre-World War I principles (Jordan and Stevens [1996]).
Demise of the gold standard magnified the importance of the elasticity (monetary
policy) role of the Federal Reserve System, adding secular choice of an inflation rate to
its original seasonal, cyclical, and panic-moderating functions.  The indispensable roles of
monetary policy making and last-resort lending might be sufficient to ensure the
relevance of the central bank, but also might increase the value of information flowing
from operational roots in the financial system.  The issue now is how much institutional
glue the central bank needs to assure the successful performance of its duties.28
Table 1













It shall be the duty of the
National Reserve Association
or any of its branches,
It shall be the duty of every
Federal reserve bank
A reserve bank shall, It shall be the duty of every
Federal reserve bank
Every Federal reserve bank
shall
Every Federal reserve bank
shall
to receive on deposit to receive on deposit receive on deposit receive on deposit
at par and without charge for
exchange,
at par and without charge for
exchange or collection
at par
(b) by mail, telegraph, or
otherwise
checks and drafts checks and drafts from member banks or from
Federal reserve banks checks
and drafts
from member banks or from
Federal reserve banks checks
and drafts
drawn upon any of its
depositors or
drawn upon any of its
depositors,
drawn upon any of its
depositors,
(c) to the credit of any other
bank having an account with
the National Reserve
Association
drawn by any of its
stockholders or depositors upon
any other stockholder or
depositor or
(c) to the credit of any other
depositor in any reserve bank
[drawn] by any of its depositors
upon any other depositor or
(a) upon request, to transfer any
part of the deposit balance of
any bank having an account
with it
drawn by any stockholder or
depositor in any other Federal
reserve bank upon funds to the
credit of said stockholder or
depositor in said reserve bank
last mentioned
(b) upon request, transfer any
part of the deposit balance of
any depositor
[drawn] by any depositor in any
other Federal reserve bank upon
funds to the credit of said
depositor in said reserve bank
last mentioned
and when remitted by a Federal
reserve bank, checks and drafts
drawn by any depositor in any
other Federal reserve bank or
member bank upon funds to the
credit of said depositor in said
reserve bank or member bank
and when remitted by a Federal
 reserve bank, checks and drafts
drawn by any depositor in any
other Federal reserve bank or
member bank upon funds to the
credit of said depositor in said
reserve bank or member bank
Sources: Willis (1923) and Warburg (1930). 29
Table 2












December  23, 1913
Under regulations to be
prescribed by the National
Reserve Association
The Federal Reserve Board
shall … promulgate  …
regulations governing the
transfer of funds at par among
Federal Reserve Banks
The regulations under which
such transfer shall be made and
the transfer charges shall be
fixed by the national Currency
Board
The Federal Reserve Board
shall … promulgate  …
regulations governing the
transfer of funds at par among
Federal reserve banks,
Nothing herein contained shall
be construed as prohibiting a
member bank from making
reasonable charges for checks
and drafts so debited to its
account, or for collecting and
remitting funds, or for exchange
sold to its patrons.  The Federal
Reserve Board shall …
promulgate … regulations
governing the transfer of funds
and charges therefor among
Federal reserve banks and their
branches,
Nothing herein contained shall
be construed as prohibiting a
member bank from charging its
actual expense incurred in
collecting and remitting funds,
or for exchange sold to its
patrons.  The Federal Reserve
Board shall, by rule, fix the
charges to be collected by the
member banks from its patrons
whose checks are cleared
through the Federal reserve
bank and the charge which may
be imposed for the service of
clearing or collection rendered
by the Federal reserve bank.
The Federal Reserve Board
shall … promulgate …
regulations governing the
transfer of funds and charges
therefor among Federal reserve
banks and their branches, and
… may at its discretion exercise
the functions of a Clearing
House for such Federal Reserve
Banks, and may also require
each such bank to exercise the
functions of a clearing house for
its shareholding banks.
… may at its discretion exercise
the functions of a clearing
house for such Federal reserve
banks, and may also require
each such bank to exercise the
functions of a clearing house for
its member banks.
… may at its discretion exercise
the functions of a clearing
house for such Federal reserve
banks, or may designate a
Federal reserve bank to exercise
such functions, and may also
require each such bank to
exercise the functions of a
clearing house for its member
banks
… may at its discretion exercise
the functions of a clearing
house for such Federal reserve
banks, or may designate a
Federal reserve bank to exercise
such functions, and may also
require each bank to exercise
the functions of a clearing
house for its members.
Sources: Willis (1923) and Warburg (1930).30
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